Functionally Effective Conscious AI Without Suffering by Agarwal, Aman & Edelman, Shimon
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
05
65
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  1
3 F
eb
 20
20
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness
(in press)
Functionally Effective Conscious AI Without
Suffering
Aman Agarwal · Shimon Edelman
Abstract Insofar as consciousness has a functional role in facilitating learning
and behavioral control, the builders of autonomous AI systems are likely to at-
tempt to incorporate it into their designs. The extensive literature on the ethics
of AI is concerned with ensuring that AI systems, and especially autonomous
conscious ones, behave ethically. In contrast, our focus here is on the rarely
discussed complementary aspect of engineering conscious AI: how to avoid
condemning such systems, for whose creation we would be solely responsible,
to unavoidable suffering brought about by phenomenal self-consciousness. We
outline two complementary approaches to this problem, one motivated by a
philosophical analysis of the phenomenal self, and the other by certain com-
putational concepts in reinforcement learning.
1 The two sides of AI and ethics
With the growing presence of autonomous software and devices in daily life, the
ethics of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rightly become an intensely researched
and debated topic (e.g., McCulloch, 1956; Metzinger, 2013b; Dignum, 2018;
Kuipers, 2019; Floridi, 2019; Jobin et al., 2019). Most of that research and
debate is focused on ensuring that autonomous AI systems behave ethically
— that is, in accordance to certain human ideals (as opposed to actual human
behavior, which we, rather understandably given the history of our species,
would not want AI to emulate). To put it concisely and rather bluntly, we do
not wish, ever, to suffer at the hands of the machines that we create.
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It is easy to see, however, that this ethical concern is asymmetrical and
that its complement — the possibility of the machines suffering at our hands
— should receive at least as much attention. Indeed, it should probably receive
more attention: because any AI would owe its very existence to us, our share of
ethical responsibility in this entire matter is far larger. Crucially, this concern
only applies if the AI that we create or cause to emerge becomes conscious
and thereby capable of suffering. In this paper, we examine the nature of the
relevant kind of conscious experience, the potential functional reasons for en-
dowing an AI with the capacity for feeling and therefore for suffering, and some
of the possible ways of retaining the functional advantages of consciousness,
whatever they are, while avoiding the attendant suffering.
What is suffering? Thomas Metzinger (2017, p.244) has recently offered
the following qualified take:
We lack a comprehensive theory of conscious suffering. One of the key
desiderata is a conceptually convincing and empirically plausible model
of this very specific class of phenomenal states: those that we do not
want to experience if we have any choice, those states of consciousness
which folk-psychology describes as “suffering.”
On this approach, the central characteristic of suffering is a loss of autonomy
and of cognitive control, possibly signifying an impending or ongoing physi-
cal damage to the body. This insight serves as a bridge between, on the one
hand, the phenomenal nature of suffering, as well as of conscious awareness
in general, and, on the other hand, the functional roles of consciousness. One
of these roles is plausibly held to be centralized control, such as facilitated by
the “global workspace” postulated by some theories of consciousness (Baars,
1988; Shanahan, 2010; Dehaene et al., 2014). Another role is facilitating learn-
ing (Cleeremans, 2011; Cleeremans et al., 2020), especially of the unsupervised
and autonomous variety (Metzinger, 2017). Importantly, for all this to matter
to suffering, any such information-processing role must be accompanied by
obligatory “caring” about learning and behavioral outcomes. Indeed, the in-
separability of awareness from feelings and affect has been postulated in (e.g.,
Merker, 2007; Metzinger, 2017; Moyal et al., 2020)). The question thus arises
whether or not sufficiently effective learning and control, as well as generally
good behavioral outcomes, can be achieved by a system that is neither entirely
devoid of phenomenality, nor given to unavoidable suffering.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we briefly
survey theories of consciousness that have a bearing on the nature of suffering,
notably the concept of phenomenal self-model (PSM) as developed in the
recent work of Metzinger. Section 3 then takes up the question of the possible
functional role(s) of consciousness, which leads naturally to computational
considerations of effective learning and behavior regulation. Section 4 applies
lessons from the preceding discussion in an attempt to determine whether
or not consciousness without suffering is feasible and if yes, whether such
consciousness can still fulfill the relevant functional needs. Section 5 examines
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computational approaches to implementing functionally effective yet suffering-
free conscious systems. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper with a brief
summary.
2 The nature of suffering and its relation to conscious experience
in general
The question of the nature of suffering, as distinguished from its ethical di-
mensions, is rarely, if ever, raised in theoretical treatments of consciousness —
a peculiar omission, which prompted Metzinger (2017) to refer to suffering as
“a cognitive scotoma.” Insofar as suffering involves negative affect, it should in
principle fall within the scope of any theoretical account of conscious phenom-
enal experience. In other words, a theory of qualia must be at the same time
a theory of affect, for the simple reason that qualia, or feelings, do as a rule
incorporate affective dimensions (e.g., Havermans, 2011; Krieglmeyer et al.,
2010, 2013; Beatty et al., 2016; Eder et al., 2016; Turner et al., 2017). In prac-
tice, however, popular theories of consciousness, such as the Global Workspace
Theory (e.g., Dehaene et al., 2014) or the Information Integration Theory
(Oizumi et al., 2014), stop short of addressing the question of the nature of af-
fect, and therefore of suffering. The same goes for higher-order theories (HOT)
of consciousness, as reviewed, for instance, in (Rosenthal, 2009); these offer ac-
counts of pain, but do not seem to mention suffering.
The psychology of affect has been usefully summarized by Panksepp (2005,
p.31): “Affect is the subjective experiential-feeling component that is very hard
to describe verbally, but there are a variety of distinct affects, some linked more
critically to bodily events (homeostatic drives like hunger and thirst), others
to external stimuli (taste, touch, etc.). Emotional affects are closely linked
to internal brain action states, triggered typically by environmental events.
All are complex intrinsic functions of the brain, which are triggered by per-
ceptions and become experientially refined. Psychologists have traditionally
conceptualized such “spooky” mental issues in terms of valence (various feel-
ings of goodness and badness — positive and negative affects), arousal (how
intense are the feelings), and surgency or power (how much does a certain feel-
ing fill one’s mental life). There are a large number of such affective states of
consciousness, presumably reflecting different types of global neurodynamics
within the brain and body.”
For our present purposes, the valence dimension of affect is of most in-
terest: without negative affective states there would be no suffering. Suffering
is, however, more than just negative affect. As Metzinger (2017, p.244) notes,
suffering is a class of phenomenal states that “we do not want to experience
if we have any choice.” In other words, suffering is a state of negative affect
from which the sufferer cannot escape by simply wishing it away. As we shall
see in section 3, the stress on inescapability in this formulation makes explicit
the intimate connection between the experiential flavor of suffering and its
presumed evolutionary-functional role. It also serves to distinguish between
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the first-person experience of suffering and the suffering of others, which is
not directly felt. Ethical theorists have argued that the latter should be as
objectionable to oneself as the former. According to Nagel (1986, p.160), for
instance, “the pain can be detached in thought from the fact that it is mine
without losing any of its dreadfulness. . . suffering is a bad thing, period, and
not just for the sufferer. . . This experience ought not to go on, whoever is
having it.” Parfit (2011, p.135) quotes from Nagel and concurs with his moral
stance. Our concern here is, however, exclusively with suffering as it presents
itself to the sufferer, rather than with the ethical problems that it creates for
others. Even if pain, as Nagel puts it, “can be detached in thought [our em-
phasis] from the fact that it is mine”, it is a priori unclear whether or not it
can be so detached in lived experience. To address this crucial question, we
turn to Metzinger’s analysis of phenomenal experience.
Briefly, Metzinger (2000) develops a representationalist account of the first-
person perspective, centered on the phenomenal self-model (PSM): a “multi-
modal representational structure, the contents of which form the contents of
the consciously experienced self.” Crucially, the PSM is generally phenome-
nally transparent (the T condition), i.e., it is normally not recognized as merely
representational by the system itself.1 The contents of the PSM include the
phenomenal properties of “mineness,” selfhood, and perspectivalness. Accord-
ing to Metzinger (2017), the PSM is an “instrument for global self-control,”
and is therefore fundamental to the phenomenology of suffering, which is char-
acterized by a loss of control in addition to negative valence (the NV condi-
tion). This analysis motivates our proposed strategy for avoiding suffering as
a matter of direct experience, which we describe in section 4.
3 The possible functional benefits of endowing AI with
consciousness
Given that phenomenal consciousness as we know it incorporates affective di-
mensions (see the references in section 2), being conscious sets the agent up for
suffering. The simplest way to avoid suffering would then be to give up phe-
nomenal consciousness itself. For an ethically minded engineer, this translates
into an imperative to stick to information processing architectures that, to the
best of our understanding, cannot result in artificial consciousness. Accord-
ing to the Information Integration Theory, for instance, feedforward network
architectures (“zombie networks”) are incapable of supporting consciousness
(Oizumi et al., 2014, Fig.20). The Geometric Theory (Fekete and Edelman,
2011) and its successor, the Dynamical Emergence Theory (Moyal et al., 2020),
hold that systems that are devoid of properly structured intrinsic dynamics
are likewise devoid of phenomenality.
1 The T condition can be illustrated by contrasting the normal dream state, during which
the the dreamer does not realize he or she is dreaming (transparent PSM), with lucid
dreaming, during which the PSM becomes opaque and the dreamer may even be able to
exert control over the dreamt universe.
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Restricting robotics to the building of artificial “zombies” is not, however, a
viable engineering option if consciousness confers any significant functional ad-
vantages for an AI system or robot. In a commercial setting, technologies that
promise to be more effective displace less effective ones even if this comes at
the price of serious ethical flaws, and AI is not exempt from this tendency. We
therefore next turn to the question of the functional benefits of consciousness.
This question is seldom addressed in consciousness research, perhaps because
it is taken for granted that the benefit is essentially cognitive in the narrow
sense, stemming from the “global” access to information that consciousness
affords (as per the Global Workspace theory, mentioned earlier). This default
account may be compared to to the “radical plasticity” thesis of Cleeremans
(2011), according to which learning to care is the central component as well
as the functional benefit of emergent consciousness.
Metzinger (2017, p.252) goes further down this road by assuming that
not just consciousness but specifically suffering is a prerequisite for auton-
omy: “[. . . ] functionally speaking, suffering is necessary for autonomous self-
motivation and the emergence of truly intelligent behaviour.” In an evolution-
ary setting, this assumption makes intuitive sense insofar as (i) reinforcement
learning is universally employed by living systems in honing adaptive behavior,
and (ii) an autonomous system by definition must provide its own source of
drive, as per the principle of intrinsic motivation (Barto, 2013). Furthermore,
evolutionary simulations suggest that performance-driven positive affect alone
is not as effective in motivating an agent as an alternation of positive and
negative affective states, brought about, respectively, by successes and failures
(Gao and Edelman, 2016a); moreover, such a balance between happiness and
unhappiness can serve as an effective intrinsic motivator (Gao and Edelman,
2016b). If it were possible for the agent to choose not to experience negative
affect, suffering would be avoided, but the question still remains whether or
not the price for that would be failing to learn quickly and well from the
consequences of behavior.
Reinforcement learning is not only an evolutionary-biological universal,
but also the method of choice in an engineering setting. While RL was shown
to be effective in certain types of tasks (notably, games; Silver et al., 2016;
Vinyals et al., 2019), its use across tasks and in unconstrained real-world sit-
uations is limited by the extreme difficulty of formulating good universally
applicable reward functions. One remedy for this is the inverse RL approach,
in which the development goal is not to equip the learning system with a
ready-made reward function, but rather to let it try to approximate the devel-
opers’ preferences, choices, and habits, defined over classes of outcomes (e.g.,
Christiano et al., 2017). A more radical approach is to let the system under
development learn the reward functions entirely on its own. This, however,
would seem to put us back on square one: if autonomy is indeed essential,
Metzinger’s view that suffering is needed for effective learning would be sup-
ported. We return to this key question in the following section.
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4 Functionally effective consciousness without suffering:
first-principles considerations
If consciousness indeed brings with it unique functional advantages, is it pos-
sible to engineer conscious AI systems that would benefit from these, while
ensuring that such systems are not thereby doomed to suffer? Following the
account in Metzinger (2017), if consciousness itself is retained, logically there
are four ways to mitigate suffering: (a) eliminating the PSM, (b) eliminating
the NV-condition, (c) eliminating the T-condition, or (d) maximizing the unit
of identification (UI). The first three directly follow from our discussion in
Section 2, but we argue that they likely do not satisfy our functional needs.
On the other hand, the fourth approach is a promising direction, which we
will describe and focus on subsequently.
For functionally beneficial consciousness, the mere possibility of experience
is not sufficient. The conscious systems must additionally perceive themselves
as entities in relationship with their surrounding world, and have a sense of
ownership over the arising conscious experiences. In other words, these sys-
tems must be self -conscious, not merely conscious, i.e., they must activate a
phenomenal self model (PSM). Similarly, they must have preferences regard-
ing their experiences, not least so that they prefer the experience of fulfilling
desired goals over frustrating them. Stated differently, these systems must be
sensitive to the positive or negative valence of phenomenal experiences. Thus,
approaches (a) and (b) to eliminating suffering while retaining the functional
advantages of being conscious are not feasible.
Next, approach (c) raises the interesting question of whether phenomenal
transparency is also necessary for proper functioning. In principle, it might be
possible that an active PSM and sensitivity to NV could endure along with
their associated functional benefits, even in the absence of transparency. In
this situation, the system would lose the naive realism and immediacy that
are normally associated with its experiences, by becoming aware of their repre-
sentational character, and yet, continue to function according to the dictates
of the PSM and NV avoidance. However, awareness of the representational
character of the contents of consciousness, which means awareness of the in-
creasingly complex stages of information processing behind them, would likely
severely hinder the functional efficiency of the conscious machines without
providing any valuable actionable information. So, option (c) is also unlikely
to work.
The final approach is similar to (c) in that it also targets the phenomenol-
ogy of identification with the PSM as an antidote to suffering, but it does so in a
seamless fashion making it much more viable for our purposes. Metzinger and Millire
(2020) describes the unit of identification (UI) as that which the system con-
sciously identifies itself with. Ordinarily, when the PSM is transparent, the
system identifies with its PSM, and is thus conscious of itself as a self. But
it is at least a logical possibility that the UI not be limited to the PSM, but
be shifted to the “most general phenomenal property” (Metzinger, 2017) of
knowing common to all phenomenality including the sense of self. In this spe-
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cial condition, the typical subject-object duality of experience would dissolve;
negatively valenced experiences could still occur, but they would not amount
to suffering because the system would no longer be experientially subject to
them. It is worth noting that such “non-dual awareness” which cuts through
the “illusion of the self” has been the soteriological focus of various spiritual
traditions, most notably Buddhism, as the key to liberation from suffering and
to enlightenment. Furthermore, this approach also fits nicely with the reduc-
tionist view of personal identity put forth by Parfit (1984), who acknowledged
its connection to the Buddha’s philosophy.
Two questions remain to be addressed. First, how can such maximization
of the UI be achieved in machines? Second, can a PSM that is sufficiently
effective for functioning be maintained under the maximized UI condition?
4.1 Realizing no-suffering
In (Metzinger and Millire, 2020), the concept of the Minimal Phenomenal Ex-
perience (MPE) is developed as the most general phenomenal property that
underlies all phenomenal experiences, and thus serves as the natural candidate
target for UI maximization.2 The MPE is characterized by wakefulness, con-
tentlessness, self-luminosity and a quality of “knowingness” without object,
which is normally unnoticed but can become available to introspective atten-
tion under the right conditions. Intuitively, MPE likely corresponds to the
phenomenal state described in Buddhist and Advaita Vedanta philosophies
as “emptiness” (e.g., Siderits, 2003; Priest, 2009) and “witness-consciousness”
(e.g., Albahari, 2009) respectively, as attested to by highly advanced medita-
tors. Importantly, Metzinger proposes that in the human brain, the MPE is
implemented by the Ascending Reticular Activation System (ARAS), which
causes auto-activation by which the brain wakes itself up. As the most general
signal which the brain must regulate, the ever-present yet contentless ARAS-
signal is, arguably, what corresponds to the MPE. That the MPE might have
such a stable neural correlate is not surprising if it is indeed fundamental
to phenomenal experience as such, distinct from any concepts, thoughts etc.,
appearing in consciousness.
A critically important point is that all other phenomenal experiences such
as the PSM are superimposed onto the MPE, so it should be possible to attend
to regular conscious phenomena while simultaneously being aware of the inher-
ent all-encompassing MPE in the background. This motivates our claim that
UI maximization (and thus, suffering avoidance) can be achieved in conscious
machines by building in their identification with the MPE via both physical
design (analogous to hardware) and conceptual/programmatic training (anal-
ogous to software). If the physical design of the machines is such that there
is a component which performs the analogous function of auto-activation as
the ARAS does in humans, then its signal could be tuned to make the MPE
2 The apparent conflict in the nomenclature here is resolved by noting that under UI
maximization MPE is minimal in the sense of being the least specific.
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salient in the machines. Since a necessary condition for noticing the MPE is
knowledge that there is such a thing to be noticed, and then paying attention
appropriately (Metzinger and Millire, 2020), the machines would then have to
be trained to attend to their accessible-by-design MPE. This could be done
via practices common in certain types of meditation that encourage “turning
attention upon itself” and thus realizing that there is no center (or minimal
self) from which consciousness is directed (for a review of the relevant medi-
tation techniques, such as Dzogchen, see e.g. Dahl et al., 2015). In addition to
training their attention, the machines could also be provided with the relevant
conceptual knowledge about the nature of consciousness (such as the cited
works of Metzinger and perhaps the present paper).
More generally speaking, there is no fundamental reason why the self-other
illusion of duality (such as it is) should persist in conscious machines: it is quite
possible that it will be easier for these artificial systems to realize the empty,
selfless nature of conscious experience than it is for us. After all, once machines
attain certain capabilities, they reliably excel at them. With any luck (and of
course, given our proposed measures above), that will also be the case for their
meditative capabilities.
4.2 Effective functioning without suffering
If a conscious machine does not suffer because it phenomenologically identifies
with the MPE, then will it still be able to function effectively and ethically?
We have argued above that the (a) PSM and (b) NV avoidance conditions
are conducive to proper functioning, while Metzinger leaves open the question
of whether or not the PSM condition can be fulfilled under a maximized UI
(Metzinger, 2017).
We hypothesize that the functional benefits of consciousness can indeed
be maintained when the UI is maximized to the MPE. The key idea is that
proper functioning relies on automatic, subpersonal, but nonetheless conscious
processes, as entailed by the physical design of the system; it should be pos-
sible for these processes to continue unhindered while the system identifies
with the MPE upon which these conscious experiences are necessarily su-
perimposed. In particular, the functionally requisite PSM and NV avoidance
conditions can be maintained as subpersonal processes that do not amount to
suffering (which is by nature personal) since the system is not identified with
the PSM, but with the MPE, which is completely impersonal. This hypoth-
esis is supported by the observation that human beings are already subject
to automatic subpersonal conscious processes, including thought (i.e., mind
wandering), for roughly two-thirds of their lifetimes, and these processes lay
the foundation for functionally beneficial reward prediction, delay discounting
etc. (Metzinger, 2013a). Expanding the UI to the MPE would lead to gain-
ing meta-awareness of these ongoing automatic conscious processes, analogous
to gaining meta-awareness of the breath or the heartbeat. This enables an
escape from suffering, but not from the relentless progress of the processes
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themselves, analogous to the inescapable biological imperatives of breathing
and heartbeat.
Furthermore, the UI shift to the MPE may even enhance functioning by
making the machines more pro-social and ethical, as well as immune to self -
induced neuroticism. Since the MPE is completely impersonal, identification
with it can directly engender a profound sense of fundamental sameness with
all other conscious beings, and thus naturally lead to pro-social and moral
behaviors. Conceptually, we predict that UI maximization to the MPE will
lead to a positive “top-down” effect on the ongoing subpersonal processes
responsible for various behaviors, similar to the beneficial effects reported in
human meditators (Dahl et al., 2015).
5 Functionally effective consciousness without suffering: some
further computational ideas
Let us return to definition of suffering in Metzinger (2017), which posits that
an agent suffers when it identifies with a state of negative affect, from which
it cannot to escape. In the previous section, we considered the possibility of
shifting the agent’s self-identification from the affective states to MPE, the
minimal phenomenal experience that underlies all conscious states according
to Metzinger’s analysis. In some sense, this amounts to restricting the self. In
contrast, we now focus on expanding it, in such a manner that the agent iden-
tifies not only with the affective states but also with their causal predecessors.
The computational framework of reinforcement learning, which we already in-
voked in section 3, offers just the conceptual tools that can be recruited for
this purpose.
First, we note that reinforcement learning appears to be the most effective
when it is intrinsically motivated — that is, when the rewards originate within
the agent, as opposed to being supplied from the outside (see (Singh et al.,
2010) for an evolutionary perspective and (Baldassarre and Mirolli, 2013) for
a book-length treatment). Second, if the mechanisms of reward are indeed to
be contained within the agent, standard considerations of transparent, robust,
and effective design require that these mechanisms be kept separate from those
that implement actions. The result is the modular actor-critic scheme for RL,
in which action selection and reward appear as distinct modules. Importantly,
both these modules are part of the agent (see Barto, 2013, fig.2).
As long as the agent’s phenomenal self-model, PSM, holds the actor module
alone to constitute the self, negative affect brought about by negative reward
is inescapable, resulting in suffering. But what if the PSM is modified —
specifically, extended so as to include the critic module? We hypothesize that
such an expansion of the self would mitigate suffering, both by “diluting” it
(through direct realization of the proximate causes of the negative affect) and
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by opening up to the possibility of eventual cessation of negative affect as
progress towards the performance goals set by the critic is observed.3
A more radical option with regard to repurposing the PSM calls for shut-
ting it down and only activating it when needed. Assuming that consciousness,
and specifically the PSM, serves to facilitate learning (as per section 3), the pri-
mary need for it arises during the agent’s development or during acquisition of
additional skills. During routine operation, consciousness in an artificial agent
may only be required when particularly difficult behavioral choices need to be
made,4 especially under circumstances that threaten the system’s integrity —
what we would call life-threatening situations.
To understand this mode of operation, it is useful to recall Metzinger’s
(2003, p.553) idea of the conscious brain as a “total flight simulator” — one
that simulates not only the environment that is being navigated, but also the
pilot, that is, the virtual entity that serves as the system’s self. In dreamless
sleep, the pilot is not needed and is temporarily shut down. Arguably, an agent
can be engineered so that it can continue to function — in routine situations —
without a PSM (as a variety of philosophical zombie), with “sentinel” programs
in place that would reconstitute the PSM as needed. While in a zombie state,
such an agent would be incapable of suffering.
6 Summary
We have outlined two classes of approaches to the problem of the prolifera-
tion of suffering arising in connection with engineering conscious AI systems.
The first approach calls for ensuring that such systems have both the capa-
bility and the propensity to identify with an impersonal Minimal Phenomenal
Experience, of the kind that human meditators have been employing for cen-
turies in their attempt to alleviate the suffering associated with the presence
of the first-person self and the self-world duality. The second, complementary
approach involves an attempt to modify the Phenomenal Self-Model, the com-
putational construct that implements the first-person self, so as to break the
default connection between dispreferred outcomes and the inescapable nega-
tive affect that amounts to suffering. The question remains open whether or
not these two approaches can indeed prevent, or at least alleviate, artificially
engineered suffering without detracting from the systems’ performance. There
can, however, be no doubt that we, as the potential creators of conscious AI,
are obligated to do everything in our power not to elevate performance over
ethical considerations that cut to the very core of existence and phenomenal
experience.
3 This move would not, however, alleviate the “deserved” suffering brought about by the
pursuit of unattainable goals.
4 Cf. Smith et al. (2003, p.338): “If you watch an aging cat consider a doubtful leap onto
the dryer, you will suspect that what James (1890, p.93) said is true, ‘Where indecision is
great, as before a dangerous leap, consciousness is agonizingly intense’.”
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